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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you and your spouse own a small commercial office building.1 You
hire a contractor to perform repairs to the building’s exterior. During the job, an
employee of the contractor comes in direct contact with an electrical wire and the
employee is severely injured. It is later discovered that the equipment the employee
was using at the time of the accident was not insulated, which contributed to the
injury. The employee sues you and the manufacturer of the equipment for his
injuries and is awarded 2.5 million dollars for his claim. The jury finds the
manufacturer of the equipment sixty percent responsible, and you ten percent for
failing to warn of the wires. It also finds the plaintiff thirty percent comparatively
negligent for his own injuries. Unfortunately, the manufacturer has no insurance
coverage and files for bankruptcy. Although your negligence was minimal in
comparison to the plaintiff and codefendant, the law allows the plaintiff to recover
seventy percent2 of the entire award from you. Your insurance pays your policy
limit of one million and you are required to pay the remaining verdict of $750,000.
As a result of the economic hardship, you lose your business and your home.

1
The fictional scenario was supplied by the author to demonstrate a possible outcome in a
jurisdiction that applies a pure form of joint and several liability.
2

Seventy percent of the award represents the entire verdict against all defendants less the
plaintiff’s percentage of negligence.
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Does this scenario seem fair? Why should you be required to pay seventy percent
of the verdict when a court of law has found you to be only ten percent responsible?
More importantly, why should you have to pay the majority of the verdict when the
plaintiff himself contributed to his injuries to a greater extent than you did? This is
an example of what can happen in a jurisdiction that applies a pure form of joint and
several liability. It presents an unfair situation where a plaintiff can collect a full
jury award from one of multiple defendants even though that defendant may be as
little as one percent responsible.
The Ohio General Assembly recently passed legislation modifying Ohio’s joint
and several liability laws in tort actions.3 Prior to this enactment, which took effect
on April 8, 2003,4 Ohio applied a pure form of joint and several liability in which a
joint tortfeasor, who is even one percent at fault for a loss, may be obligated to pay
all economic and non-economic damages to a plaintiff.5 The law now provides for a
modified form in which joint and several liability is abolished in regard to a
plaintiff’s non-economic damages.6 Joint and several liability still applies to
economic damages,7 but only after a threshold percentage of liability is met.8
Therefore, a plaintiff can only collect the relative percentage of his or her noneconomic damages9 that correspond to the percentage of liability found against that
defendant. However, a plaintiff may still be able to collect the entire amount of his
or her economic damages from a defendant, but only when that defendant is found to
be more than fifty percent responsible.10
The outcome of the above mentioned scenario would be different when analyzed
under Ohio’s new law. Under Ohio’s modified form of joint and several liability, the
plaintiff would only be permitted to collect up to ten percent of his economic and
3

See Am. Sub. S.B. 120, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003).

4

Id.

5

The Ohio Legislature had previously enacted a modified version of joint and several
liability as part of the 1996 tort reform package. See Am. Sub. H.B. 350, 121st Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Ohio 1996). However, in 1999, the entire tort reform package was eventually ruled
unconstitutional and Ohio returned to applying joint and several liability in its pure form. See
State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999).
6
See Am. Sub. S.B. 120, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003). According to the Ohio
Revised Code, a “non-economic loss” includes: “[H]arm that results from an injury, death, or
loss to person that is subject of a tort action, including, but not limited to, pain and suffering;
loss of society, consortium, companionship, care assistance, counsel, instruction, training, or
education; mental anguish, and any other intangible loss.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.011
(C) (F) (West Supp. 2003).
7
See Am. Sub. S.B. 120, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003). According to the Ohio
Revised Code, an “economic loss” includes: “All wages, salaries, or other compensation lost
as a result of an injury, death, or loss to a person or property that is a subject of a tort action. ..
All expenditures for medical care or treatment, rehabilitation services . . . . Any other
expenditures incurred as a result of an injury, death, or loss to person or property that is a
subject of a tort action.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.011 (C) (F) (West Supp. 2003).
8

See Am. Sub. S.B. 120, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003).

9

See id.

10

Id.
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non-economic damages from you, representing the percentage for which the jury
found you liable. However, had the jury found you or any collectable defendant to
be more than fifty percent responsible, joint and several liability would be applicable
to you or that defendant, but only in regard to the plaintiff’s economic damages.11
This Note contends that if Ohio insists on retaining some form of joint and
several liability, the recently adopted modified version is a desirable alternative to
returning to the pure form.12 As compared to the pure form, the modified version
promotes a more balanced tort system and represents a fair compromise to the
competing interests of both plaintiffs and defendants. Part II of this Note reviews the
history of joint and several liability and examines Ohio’s application of this legal
doctrine. Part III looks at prior constitutional challenges to various tort reform
measures, and analyzes these challenges in light of Ohio’s new law. It presents the
likely parallel attacks against the constitutionality of the modified form of joint and
several liability and provides insights as to how the new law will pass constitutional
muster in the face of such challenges. Part IV examines policy arguments against a
pure form of joint and several liability. It demonstrates how, as compared to the pure
form, Ohio’s new joint and several liability laws are more in accord with
comparative negligence standards and how they help foster a growing economy.
Finally, Part V concludes by advocating for the modified form of joint and several
liability and proposes that Ohio’s new laws will minimize the disparities and
inadequacies that exist when joint and several liability is applied in its pure form.13
II. HISTORY OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY DOCTRINE
A. Its Origin
Joint and several liability arises when multiple defendants are found liable for the
same tort.14 It comes into play when one defendant is found partially liable and there
are other culpable parties who are unavailable, uninsured, insolvent, or not sued.15
The doctrine originally was applied at English common law in cases where multiple
11

The fictional scenario was supplied by the author to demonstrate the difference in
outcomes when applying a pure form of joint and several liability versus applying Ohio’s new
modified form. Other states have totally done away with joint and several liability and make
no distinction between economic and non-economic damages. If this were the case in this
scenario, no matter what percentage the defendant was faulted to pay, that defendant would
only have to pay the corresponding percentage of both the plaintiff’s economic and noneconomic damages.
12
Along with defending the modified form of joint and several liability, the author will
also discuss points in favor of abolishing joint and several liability all together. However, a
detailed argument in favor of total abolishment of joint and several liability is beyond the
scope of this Note.
13

Although this Note mentions various tort reform measures, it will not attempt to go into
depth on the fairness or constitutionality of other reform provisions. The author will primarily
focus on joint and several liability laws.
14
See Paul Bargren, Joint and Several Liability: Protection for Plaintiffs, 1994 WIS. L.
REV. 453 (1994) (detailing historical and background information pertaining to joint and
several liability).
15

Id.
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defendants acted “in concert”16 or breached a common duty.17 Joint and several
liability was later extended in the United States to apply to concurrent torts where
multiple defendants committed independent torts that caused one indivisible injury to
a plaintiff, regardless of a “concert of action.”18 The rationale for allowing a plaintiff
to recover one hundred percent of his or her injuries from one defendant was based
on practicality.19 The modern form of joint and several liability allows that “two or
more tortfeasors may be subject to liability for the same harm and may be sued by
the plaintiff, together or separately.”20 A plaintiff can recover once, either
completely from one of the tortfeasors, or in part from each.21 Therefore, a
defendant can be held jointly or severally liable for an injury in which his negligence
was a proximate cause, and just because another tortfeasor is immune from suit does
not relieve him of his liability for a plaintiff’s indivisible injury.22 This occurs
irrespective of the percentage of fault found against that defendant.23
There are competing opinions about the fairness of joint and several liability as
well as compelling arguments for both sides. Supporters of the joint and several
liability doctrine argue that it upholds the compensatory goal of our tort system by
allowing plaintiffs to be fully and adequately made whole.24 Supporters also argue
that defendants are in a better position of bearing and spreading the cost of
unavailable defendants’ liability than injured plaintiffs, and that abolishing this rule
would shield responsible defendants while preventing innocent plaintiffs from being
fully compensated.25
Opponents of the doctrine propose that a pure form of joint and several liability
weakens the deterrence goal of our tort system by placing full responsibility on a
single defendant, even though that defendant took reasonable means to prevent
injury to the plaintiff.26 Others argue that joint and several liability encourages
abusive litigation practices because it allows plaintiffs to sue any defendant who may
be only marginally responsible, yet able to pay the full verdict in the event the
plaintiff is able to establish merely one percent liability against them.27 Therefore, a
16
Also referred to as a “shared tort,” where multiple tortfeasors act together in breaching
one common duty, causing injury to a plaintiff. Id. at 455.
17
Id.; see also Han-Duck Lee, An Empirical Study of the Effects of Tort Reforms on the
Rate of Tort Filings 28 (1992).
18

Bargen, supra note 14, at 455; Lee, supra note 17, at 29.

19

See Frank J. Vandall, Articles: A Critique of the Restatement (Third), Apportionment as
it Affects Joint and Several Liability, 49 EMORY L.J. 565, 566 (2000).
20

VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES
Academic Press) (1994).

IN

AMERICAN TORT LAW 741 (Carolina

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Lee, supra note 17, at 29.

25

Id. at 29-30.

26

Id. at 30.

27

Id.
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“deep pocket” defendant who has minimal liability may be hit hard in order to
compensate for other negligent defendants who are unable to pay their share.28 Also,
joint and several liability arguably increases litigation costs because each party must
pay defense costs in order to prove their proper share of liability among multiple
defendants.29 Finally, some opponents believe that, in jurisdictions that apply joint
and several liability, the uncertainty in the outcome of trials is increased, thus
reducing insurance availability and increasing insurance costs.30
Although, under certain circumstances, there are persuasive arguments to apply
joint and several liability, these arguments are far outweighed by the need to limit or
abolish joint and several liability, as illustrated by viewing the history of the doctrine
and the unfairness that it has presented in our legal system.
B. In Ohio
There has been an ongoing battle in Ohio since the late 1980’s between the
General Assembly and the Ohio Supreme Court over various tort reform issues.31
Ohio’s Senate and House of Representatives passed a massive tort reform bill, which
was signed into law by former Governor George Voinovich on October 28, 1996,
and took effect on January 27, 1997.32 This comprehensive bill contained numerous
provisions affecting the access to judicial relief including limitations on noneconomic and punitive damage awards; a medical claims statute of repose, product
liability and improvements to real property; offsets for collateral benefits; and
modification of joint and several liability.33 Like the recent enactment of Am. Sub.
S.B. 120,34 the 1996 tort reform Act applied a modified version of joint and several
liability by abrogating it for non-economic damages and applying it for economic
damages, but only when a defendant is found to be more than fifty percent at fault.35
The constitutionality of the 1996 reform effort was challenged on November 20,
1997, when the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers and the AFL-CIO filed suit against
six Ohio Court of Common Pleas judges.36 By 1999, the Ohio Supreme Court struck
down the entire bill in its ruling in State ex rel. Ohio Acad. Of Trial Lawyers v.
Sheward.37 The court held the bill unconstitutional in toto38 and found that the

28

Id.

29

Lee, supra note 17, at 30.

30

Id. at 30-31.

31

See Jonathon Tracy, Ohio ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward: The End
Must Justify the Means, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 883 (2000).
32

See Am. Sub. H.B. 350, 21st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1996).

33

Id.

34

See Am. Sub. S.B. 120, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003).

35

See Am. Sub. H.B. 350, 21st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1996).

36

See State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1068 (Ohio
1999).
37

Id. The date of the ruling was August 16, 1999. Id.

38

Id. at 1111.
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legislature’s enactment violated judicial authority.39 The court found that the
plaintiffs had standing to bring the action,40 and the main thrust of the court’s
decision was that the bill violated the one-subject rule of Ohio’s Constitution.41 The
court also reviewed the constitutionality of only seven of the one hundred provisions
within the bill. These provisions were discussed in light of state constitutional rights
of equal protection, due process, and the right to trial by jury.42
After the ruling in Sheward, Ohio returned to applying a pure form of joint and
several liability43up until the recent 2003 enactment when the Ohio rules governing
contributory fault and joint and several liability were again revised.44 Because of the
recent enactment, existing Ohio statutes involving joint and several liability,
contribution, contributory negligence, and assumption of risks were repealed,45and
many new statutes were added.46 Ohio’s new law brings back the modified form of
joint and several liability. A defendant now can be held jointly and severally liable
for a loss with respect to only economic damages, and the rule applies only to the
defendant who is: (a) found to be more than fifty percent liable for a plaintiff’s injury
or loss,47 or (b) found to have committed an intentional tort.48 For non-economic
damages, a liable defendant is now made to pay only his proportionate share, no
matter what percentage of negligence is allocated to him.49 Therefore, if a defendant
is found fifty percent or less responsible he or she is only required to pay the
corresponding percentage of both economic and non-economic damages.
Ohio’s new laws require that the trier of fact specify the percentage of tortious
conduct attributable to: (a) the plaintiff; (b) the defendants from whom plaintiff is
seeking recovery; and (c) parties from whom the plaintiff is not seeking recovery.50
39

Id. at 1105-06.

40

Id. at 1084-85.

41

Id. at 1111. The Ohio Constitution states that, “[N]o bill shall contain more than one
subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.” OHIO CONST. art. II § 15(d). See State ex
rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 631 N.E.2d 582 (Ohio 1994).
42

See Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062; OHIO CONST. art. I §§ 2, 5, 16.

43

See Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062.

44

See Am. Sub. S.B. 120, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003).

45

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.31-2307.33, 2315.19, 2315.20 (West Supp. 2003).

46

Id. §§ 2307.22-2307.23, 2315.42-2315.46, 2307.25-2307.28.

47

Id. § 2307.22 (a)(1).

48

Id. § 2307.22 (a)(3).

49

Id. § 2307.22 (c).

50

Id. § 2307.23.
The bill states:
(A) In determining the percentage of tortious conduct attributable to a party in a tort
action . . . the court in a nonjury action shall make findings of fact, and the jury in a
jury action shall return a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories,
that shall specify all of the following: (1) The percentage of tortuous conduct that
proximately caused the injury or loss to person or property or the wrongful death that
is attributable to the plaintiff and to each party to the tort action from whom the
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This is a major change from the prior law, which precluded evidence involving a
non-named party and limited findings of negligence only against the parties before
the court. The sum of the tortious conduct so determined must equal one hundred
percent.51 Ohio now also permits defendants to use the plaintiff’s comparative fault
as a defense to product liability actions.52 This is true only as to an affirmative
defense to contributory negligence, whereas express or implied assumption of risk
remains a complete bar to recovery.53 Furthermore, the new laws provide for a right
of contribution54 for defendants found jointly and severally liable as well as those
defendants who were not a party to the original lawsuit.55
Although under the pure form of joint and several liability plaintiffs were more
likely to receive full compensation, it was often at the expense of a victim defendant
who was pulled into litigation for the sole purpose of satisfying a large verdict.56
Thus, Ohio’s modified joint and several liability laws are more fair than the
plaintiff seeks recovery in this action; (2) The percentage of tortuous conduct that
proximately caused the injury or loss to person or property or the wrongful death that
is attributable to each person from whom the plaintiff does not seek recovery from this
action.
Id.
51

Id. The statute states, “[t]he sum of the percentages of tortious conduct as determined
pursuant to division (A) of this section shall equal one hundred per cent.” Id.
52

Id. §§ 2315.42-2315.43. The bill states:
Contributory negligence or other contributory tortious conduct may be asserted as an
affirmative defense to a product liability claim. Contributory negligence or other
contributory tortious conduct of a plaintiff does not bar the plaintiff from recovering
damages that have directly and proximately resulted from the tortious conduct of one
or more other persons, if the contributory negligence or other contributory tortious
conduct of the plaintiff was not greater then the combined tortious conduct of all other
persons from whom the plaintiff seeks recovery and of all other persons from whom
the plaintiff does not seek recovery in this action.
Id.
53

Id. §§ 2315.42(b). The bill states:
If express or implied assumption of the risk is asserted as an affirmative defense to a
product liability claim and if it is determined that the plaintiff expressly or impliedly
assumed a risk and that the express or implied assumption of the risk was a direct and
proximate cause of harm for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages, the express
or implied assumption of the risk is a complete bar to the recovery of those damages.
Id.
54

The bill states:
If one or more persons are jointly and severally liable in tort for the same injury or
loss…there may be a right of contribution even though judgment has not been
recovered against all or any of them. The right of contribution exists only in favor of a
tortfeasor who has paid more than that tortfeasor’s proportionate share of the common
liability, and that tortfeasor’s total recovery is limited to the amount paid by that
tortfeasor in excess of that tortfeasor’s proportionate share.
Id. § 2307.25(a).
55

Id. § 2307.225.

56

Pat O’Callahan, Sticker Shock: Torts and Retorts; Physicians Work to Limit Malpractice
Awards While Plaintiff’s Attorneys Defend, THE NEWS TRIB., Jan. 18, 2004, at B08.
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previously applied pure form because they do not subject defendants to pay for noneconomic damages in which they are not responsible, yet the laws still allow
plaintiffs to recover in full for their out-of-pocket expenses.57
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO VARIOUS TORT REFORM MEASURES
The Ohio Supreme Court has taken an active role in tort reform legislation over
the past two decades by striking down tort reform provisions based on allegations of
constitutional infringements.58 Although the constitutionality of the modified form
of joint and several liability was not specifically discussed in Sheward,59 it will,
undoubtedly be challenged at some point.
In Sheward, the plaintiffs claimed that several portions of the 1996 tort reform
bill violated certain provisions of the Ohio Constitution.60 Because case law existed,
which had previously struck down certain provisions of the bill, the General
Assembly allegedly tried to usurp the court’s constitutional authority by violating the
separation of powers provisions of the Ohio Constitution in not recognizing prior
holdings of the court.61 Ohio case law, however, is scarce in specifically analyzing
the constitutionality of a modified form of joint and several liability. Therefore, the
separation of powers approach is not likely to be the approach used in any future
attacks on Ohio’s current joint and several liability laws.
Ohio’s new law should survive constitutional attack under the “single subject”
rule, which only allows an act to be brought forth under one subject.62 The majority
in Sheward found that the 1996 tort reform Act covered a multitude of subjects that
included “eighteen different titles, thirty-eight different chapters, and over one
hundred different sections of the Revised Code.”63 The test used by the court was to
determine whether the topics “share a common purpose or relationship.”64 The court
found that the Act did not meet this threshold, therefore it did not comply with the

57
“The notion that someone can be as little as one percent at fault but yet made to pay [one
hundred] percent of costs defies any common sense of fairness. Ohio must join 33 states who
have reformed their joint and several liability laws to reflect proportionate liability.”
Regarding Apportionment of Liability in Civil Actions. Second Hearing on SB 120 Before the
House Civil & Commercial Law Committee (2002) (statement of Ty Pine, National Federation
of Independent Businesses), at http://han2.hannah.com/htbin/f.com/oh_ban_124%3ASB
120.notes (last visited February 2004).
58

See Stephen J. Werber, Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law: Ohio Tort Reform
Versus the Ohio Constitution, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1155-57 (1996); Tracy, supra note 31, at 833.
59

See Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062.

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 1098.

63

Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1099.

64

Id. The court looked to see whether the topics of the Act “unite to form a single subject”
and did not find this to be the case. Id. It stated that, “Am. Sub. H.B. No. 350 attempts to
combine the wearing of seat belts with employment discrimination claims, class actions
arising from the sale of securities . . . recall notifications, . . . [to] actions by a roller skater
with supporting affidavits in a medical claim . . . and so on.” Id. at 1100.
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“single-subject” rule.65 Ohio’s General Assembly however, brought forth Ohio’s
current legislation under a single subject, discussing only joint and several liability
and related doctrines of liability apportionment.66 Therefore, because Ohio’s recent
enactment deals with only one subject, it should not be found to violate the “singlesubject” rule.
The modified form of joint and several liability passes the “single-subject” test,
thus is not, in itself, unconstitutional. Had it not been for the “sledgehammer”67
effect in Sheward, the provision modifying joint and several liability would have
withstood constitutional scrutiny. The Sheward court even noted that it only
addressed a few of the provisions in the 1996 reform bill, and they considered their
review of a few provisions in that bill68 to be limited and “not to be construed as
either a rejection or acceptance of those claims not herein considered.” 69 Prior to
Sheward, one commentator stated, “[T]he only proposals [of the 1996 tort reform
bill] that are truly oppressive and worthy of constitutional attack are those relating to
the statutes of repose, and, perhaps, the ceilings on non-economic loss and punitive
damages.”70 In 2000, another author stated: “[A] significant number of provisions
[in the 1996 tort reform bill] most likely would have survived constitutional
scrutiny.”71
The next section of this Note analyzes three provisions of the Ohio Constitution
that have been utilized in challenging various tort reform measures in Ohio as well as
other states. These provisions are: the right to trial by jury, equal protection of the
law, and the right to due process. Arguments used in these prior attacks will be
examined as possible rationale for future attacks on Ohio’s modified joint and
several liability laws. The Note presents arguments to show how the new law will
withstand such attacks.72

65

See generally Sheward.

66

See Am. Sub. S.B. 120, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003).

67

Stephen J. Werber, Ohio: A Microcosm of Tort Reform Versus State Constitutional
Mandates, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 4 1045, 1061 (2001). Werber concedes that although there were
certain provisions in the 1996 Tort Reform Act that were unconstitutional, not a single section
ever took effect. Id. He states that, “This sledgehammer approach, however, leaves the door
open to a well-crafted series of Acts that could force the court to address each on its own
constitutional merit . . . [and] [m]any provisions [of the Tort Reform Act], if enacted within
the confines of a single subject, should pass constitutional muster.” Id.
68

Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1102.

69

Id.

70

Werber, supra note 58, at 1158.

71
Recent Cases: State Tort Reform-Ohio Supreme Court Strikes Down State General
Assembly’s Tort Reform Initiative, 113 HARV. L. REV. 804 (2004).
72

There is little Ohio case law in existence that discusses the constitutionality of abolishing
or modifying joint and several liability. Therefore, the author will pull from other states’ case
law as well as other tort reform measures previously challenged in Ohio to support the
author’s contentions.
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A. The Right to Trial by Jury
When joint and several liability is applied, thereby increasing the liability of a
defendant above the percentage allocated by the fact finder, that defendant has
arguably been denied his or her right to trial by jury. Challenges to Ohio’s modified
joint and several liability laws may attempt to look to The Right to Trial clause of
Ohio’s Constitution if attempts to bring back the pure form are made. The Ohio
Constitution states, “[T]he right of trial by jury shall be inviolate . . . .”73 This means
that the right to trial by jury cannot be denied to any party involved in civil tort
litigation. This right is “fundamental, substantive, and included within it, ‘is the
right to have a jury determine all questions of fact, including the amount of damages
to which the plaintiff is entitled.’”74 This fundamental right of trial by jury clearly
supports total abolition of joint and several liability. Therefore, arguing a
defendant’s right to trial would be even more persuasive in defending the modified
form of joint and several liability.
Those who oppose a modified form of joint and several liability75 may attempt to
use similar constitutional arguments, to those previously used in challenging general
or non-economic damage caps, in attempts to bring back the pure form. In looking at
general damage caps, limiting recovery to $200,000,76 the Sheward court looked at
previous Ohio cases and interpreted them to hold that caps on general damages were
unconstitutional because the right to trial by jury includes the right to have the jury
determine the amount of damages to be awarded.77 Challengers may claim that
abolishing joint and several liability for non-economic damages limits the damages
owed to an injured plaintiff and is equivalent to placing a cap on a plaintiff’s general
damages. However, returning to a pure form violates the defendant’s parallel right to
trial by jury.78

73

OHIO CONST. art. I § 5.

74

Werber, supra note 58, at 1191 (quoting Galayda v. Lake Hosp. Sys., 644, N.E.2d 298,
301 (Ohio 1994)) (holding that a statute that allowed periodic payments of judgments violated
the right to trial by jury because this reduced the value of the award determined by the jury).
Werber also refers to another Ohio case in support of this argument: Jeanne v. Hawkes Hosp.
of Mt. Carmel, 598 N.E.2d 1174, 1180 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (reiterating that the right to a jury
trial is a substantive right which may not be abridged). Id.
75

The author is referring to those who oppose the modified form of joint and several
liability as those who wish to retain the pure form. However, not all persons who oppose the
modified form of joint and several liability wish to bring back the pure form. Some opponents
to the modified form feel that joint and several liability should be totally abolished. Therefore,
those who argue total abolition may not support the modified version constitutionally and may
want to strike down the modified version as a way to gain total abolition.
76

See State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1091 (Ohio
1999).
77

Id. at 1092. The court reviewed the rulings of Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio
1991) (finding limits to general damage awards violated the due course of law provision of the
Ohio Constitution). See id. at 1091-92; see also OHIO CONST. art. I § 16.
78

Abolishing joint and several liability for both economic and non-economic damages
adds even more support to this counter argument.
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According to Justice Sweeney in Morris v. Savoy, “inviolate,” means “free from
substantial impairment.”79 This provision does not distinguish between plaintiffs and
defendants.80 Justice Sweeney acknowledged that included within the right to trial
by jury is not only the right to have a jury determine issues of fact, but also to assess
the damages.81 One Ohio scholar agrees with this reasoning and contends82 that
when joint and several liability is applied, and a defendant is made to pay more than
his proportionate share of the damages allocated by a jury, his or her right to trial by
jury is violated.83 Changing the percentage established by a jury as to how much that
defendant is to pay, in effect, changes the jury verdict.84
There exists an equally strong argument to retaining Ohio’s modified form of
joint and several liability if attempts are made to return to the pure form. “Just as a
cap cannot constitutionally lower a jury determination, a rule that increases that
determination as to any party cannot withstand identical constitutional scrutiny.”85
In applying joint and several liability to an entire jury award against only one of
multiple co-defendants, the verdict against that one defendant becomes severely
altered.86 These arguments show strong support for retaining the modified form of
joint and several liability, and if challenged under Ohio’s Right to Trial by Jury
provision, the new joint and several liability laws should be upheld.
B. Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause of Ohio’s Constitution87 may also be looked to if
Ohio’s Ohio’s joint and several liability laws are challenged. It states:
All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for
their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter, reform,
or abolish the same, whenever they may deem it necessary; and no special
privileges or immunities shall ever be granted, that may not be altered,
revoked, or repealed by the General Assembly.88
79

See Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 779 (Ohio 1991).

80

Werber, supra note 58, at 1192. “If the jury determines that defendant “A” owes 60% of
a $100,000 economic loss, the legislature has no right to increase the obligation from $60,000
to $100,000 no matter how laudable its objectives. What the General Assembly has not
recognized is that defendants, not just plaintiffs, have a vested right in jury verdicts.” Id.
81

Morris, 576 N.E.2d at 779.

82

Stephen J. Werber, Remarks at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law Faculty Speaker
Series, Tort Reform: State and Federal Constitutional Concerns (Nov. 19, 2003).
83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Werber, supra note 67, at 1069.

86

A jury verdict against one of multiple co-defendants is less altered with the modified
form of joint and several liability because it only applies to economic damage. Therefore, a
verdict would be altered even less and would be more consistent with the juror’s intentions if
joint and several liability is not applied at all.
87

OHIO CONST. art. I § 2.

88

Id.
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Equal protection arguments usually involve allegations that a person or persons
who fall under a certain statutory classification are denied a right that others, who are
similarly situated, are not.89 In looking at the Equal Protection Clause to determine
whether a statutory classification is constitutional, courts apply one of three levels of
scrutiny.90 The first and least stringent form is the “rational basis” test, which looks
to see whether the classification created by the statute has some reasonable
relationship to a legitimate legislative objective.91 The second, is categorized as an
intermediate test often called the “heightened scrutiny” or “means-end scrutiny” test,
which looks to determine whether a classification “substantially furthers a legitimate
legislative purpose.”92 The third and most rigorous level is the “strict scrutiny” test,
which determines whether the classification is narrowly tailored and necessary to
meet a compelling state interest.93 The rational basis test is the standard that most
tort reform laws are and should be judged under.94
In Morris, the Supreme Court of Ohio applied the appropriate “rational basis”
test to determine whether an Ohio statute, which placed a cap of $200,000 on general
damage awards in medical malpractice claims, was constitutional.95 The Court
declared that in challenging the constitutionality of a law under the Equal Protection
Clause, one must demonstrate that either: (a) there was no rational basis for the
creation of the class itself, or (b) that the people within the class were being treated
unfairly in furthering the legitimate governmental interest.96 Although the court
found a distinction in treatment between those within and those outside the class, the
court failed to find the statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.97 In
applying the “rational basis” test, the court declared that it would uphold a statutory
classification as long as the classification is rationally related to a legitimate

89

Bair v. Peck, 811 P.2d 1176, 1182 (Kan. 1991).

90

Id.

91

Id. The “rational basis” test only subjects a statute to “minimal scrutiny and will be
upheld so long as the classifications made are rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”
Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, slip op. at 8 (Tex. Filed Sept. 21, 1988) (Phillips, T.,
dissenting).
92
Id. This test is also referred to as the middle-tier, or “means scrutiny” and “is applied
when a statute burdens a sensitive, but not a suspect, class or impinges on an important, but
not a fundamental, right.” Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, slip op. at 7-8 (Tex. Filed
Sept. 21, 1988) (Phillips, T., dissenting) (claiming that the non-economic cap on damages did
not violate any provision of the Texas Constitution and, furthermore, that the “cap operates to
limit the liability of each defendant rather than the recovery of the plaintiff”). Id. at 1.
93
Id. at 7-8 (Phillips, J., dissenting). The “strict scrutiny” test is normally applied to laws
that “burdens an inherently suspect class or affects a fundamental liberty right.” Id. at 7
(Phillips, J., dissenting).
94

Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, slip op. at 12 (Tex. filed Sept. 21, 1988)
(Phillips, J., dissenting).
95

Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 771 (Ohio 1991).

96

Id.

97

Id. at 772.
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governmental purpose.98 However, it stated that it is up to the legislature to decide
whether a statute is constitutional and that the court “does not inquire whether…[the]
statute is wise or desirable.”99 Therefore, based on the Morris decision, the Equal
Protection Clause isn’t likely to support a successful challenge to Ohio’s modified
joint and several liability laws.
Case law from other states will assist in defending the constitutionality of Ohio’s
modified form of joint and several liability. For instance, an Arizona Court of
Appeals also applied the “rational basis” test in Church v. Rawson Drug & Sundry
Co.100 to uphold an Arizona statute, which abolished joint and several liability.101
The case arose out of an injury that the plaintiff sustained while unloading containers
of merchandise at work.102 She sued the distributor, Rawson, alleging its employees
had negligently stacked the merchandise on pallets, which caused the containers to
fall on her.103 The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded her
$52,625.50.104 The jury apportioned fault equally among the plaintiff, her employer
and Rawson. However, because an Arizona statute made her employer immune
from suit due to the fact that the plaintiff had already received workers’
compensation benefits, the plaintiff was only allowed to collect one-third of her
damages from Rawson, amounting to $17,541.83.105 At the time of this lawsuit,
Arizona’s joint and several liability statute stated that each defendant could be held
liable only for the amount of damages allocated to that defendant, and that joint and
several liability is to be applied only when two defendants are acting in concert,
“when one party is an agent of another, or when a cause of action relates to
hazardous wastes or substances.”106
The plaintiff argued that doing away with joint and several liability denied her
equal protection under Arizona’s Constitution because the law discriminated against
certain classes of plaintiffs.107 She argued that without joint and several liability,
some plaintiffs would not receive full recovery when the defendants are insolvent or
immune from suit, while other plaintiffs who file suit against able-paying defendants,
would receive full recovery.108 The court rejected these arguments, and found that
the statute met the rational basis test.109 The court stated that laws will be deemed
98

Id. at 781.

99

Id. at 772.

100

Church v. Rawson Drug & Sundry Co., No. 1 CA-CV 90-0357, 1992 Ariz. App. LEXIS
276, at *344 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 1992).
101

Id.

102

Id. at *344.

103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Id. at *344-55.

106

Id. at *345.

107

Id. at *348.

108

Id. at *351.
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constitutional and legislation will be upheld when the statute is found to be rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose.”110
If judicial attempts to bring back a pure form of joint and several liability are
made in Ohio, challengers of Ohio’s current joint and several liability laws will
likely use a similar approach as the plaintiff in Church by claiming that without
applying a pure form of joint and several liability, plaintiffs who have no choice but
to sue insolvent or uncollectible defendants will be treated differently than similarly
situated plaintiffs who are able to sue able-paying defendants. Arguably, the
treatment will be different, in that one class of plaintiffs will be able to collect the
entire verdict,111 while another class will not.112 However, as in Church, Ohio’s
legislative enactment will also be upheld under “rational basis” scrutiny and the
same reasoning that the Church court used in evaluating Arizona’s statute in
abolishing joint and several liability will also be applicable to Ohio’s laws, which
only partially abolishes joint and several liability.
C. Due Process
As previously expressed, future challenges to Ohio’s modified joint and several
liability laws may look to Morris in trying to bring back the pure form of joint and
several liability. The “due course of law” provision of the Ohio Constitution is
considered to be the equivalent of the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution.113 It states, “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury
done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay . . . .”114 The
review of due process claims is similar to that of equal protection claims.115 “The
109

Id. at *350. The Church court held that in looking at The Equal Protection Clause, the
correct standard of review was the rational basis test. Id. The court also relied on language by
the Supreme Court of Kansas in a 1978 case, which commented on the abolition of joint and
several liability in stating, “[T]here is nothing inherently fair about a defendant who is 10% at
fault paying 100% of the loss, and there is no social policy that should compel defendants to
pay more than their fair share of the loss. Plaintiffs now take the parties as they find them.”
Id. (citing Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (Kan. 1978)).
110
Id. It can be argued that the General Assembly’s purpose in modifying Ohio’s joint and
several liability laws are likely to be similar to that of the Arizona’s legislature. Therefore, if
challenges are made to change Ohio’s joint and several liability laws, Ohio’s courts will most
likely find that Ohio’s joint and several liability laws, in creating two classifications, serve a
legitimate government purpose and are rationally related to that purpose.
111

Under a pure form of joint and several liability, a classification of plaintiffs are created
who can collect an entire full verdict from any able paying defendant, who is at least one
percent responsible, for both economic and non-economic damages.
112
Under the current, modified form of joint and several liability, another classification of
plaintiffs are created who can only collect from an able paying defendant for the full cost of
economic damages, but only if that defendant is more than fifty percent at fault. In regards to
non-economic damages, those plaintiffs can only collect that portion of the verdict that the
defendant is responsible for.
113

Id. at 780.

114

OHIO CONST. art. I § 16.
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Due Process Clause protects liberty and property interests while the Equal Protection
Clause protects against discriminatory classifications.”116
Though the majority in Morris found the Act that limited general damages did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause, it did find it to violate Ohio’s Due Process
Clause.117 The court observed that the Act was created with the legislative intent of
reducing rising medical malpractice insurance rates, but it found no evidence to show
a rational relationship between malpractice insurance rates and general damage
awards over $200,000.118 The court found it to be unconstitutional because the law
did not “bear a real and substantial relation to public health or welfare and further
because it is unreasonable and arbitrary” to impose the cost of the legislature’s
intended outcome on those “most severely injured by medical malpractice.”119
Although Morris found general damage caps in medical malpractice cases to
violate Ohio’s Due Process Clause, the Church court did not find that an Arizona
statute, which abolished joint and several liability, infringed upon its state’s Due
Process Clause.120 The Church court noted three objectives that the Arizona
legislature had in mind when creating a statute that abolished joint and several
liability.121 The court determined that the legislature’s purpose in abrogating joint
and several liability was based on the following reasons: (a) it was consistent with
the state’s pure comparative negligence standards in which a plaintiff’s recovery is
reduced by the degree of fault that the plaintiff contributed to his or her own injury;
(b) it was “more fair to impose liability according to fault, rather than to have one
who is marginally at fault pay all of the damages”; and (c) by protecting defendants
from paying more than their share of fault, implementation of the statute is an
attempt to “alleviate a perceived crisis caused by rising insurance rates.”122
The plaintiff argued that the statute abolishing joint and several liability did not
further the legislature’s interest in a rational way and that the statute did not allow for
a fair apportionment of liability.123 Although the court recognized the plaintiff’s
argument that there may be other ways of “achieving the goal of fairness in this
area,” it did not agree that the method the legislature used was irrational.124 The
court found that even if there are some differences in the classifications created by a
statute, “it is not unconstitutional if it rests on some reasonable basis.”125 Therefore,
115

Church v. Rawson Drug & Sundry Co., No. 1 CA-CV 90-0357, 1992 Ariz. App. LEXIS
276, at *348 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 1992).
116

Id.

117

Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 691, 772 (Ohio 1991).

118

Id. at 770.

119

Id. at 771.

120

Church, 1992 Ariz. App. LEXIS 276, at *344.

121

Id. at *350.

122

Id.

123

Id.

124

Id. at *350-51.

125

Id.
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it was determined that the statute abolishing joint and several liability did bear a
rational relationship to the legislature’s intent and the law was upheld.126
It is likely that Ohio’s purpose in enacting the current legislation is conceivably
the same or, at least, similar to that of the Arizona legislature in Church. Therefore,
if the Church court found that the statute abolishing joint and several liability was
constitutional under the Due Process Clause, any challenges to Ohio’s modified joint
and several liablity laws should also be upheld under the Due Process Clause
because the classifications created by Ohio’s laws are rationally related to the Ohio
General Assembly’s intent.
Challenges to legislation are not just grounded in case law and constitutional
attacks. Public policy and fairness arguments are both highly effective approaches
used in challenging and defending laws. The next two sections examine joint and
several liability laws in modern day society and conclude that the doctrine is not
conducive to our modern day judicial system.
IV. POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST A PURE FORM OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
A. Joint and Several Liability in a Comparative Fault System
The doctrine of joint and several liability does not comport with current Ohio
comparative fault standards.127 The fairness arguments that formed the rationale
behind abandoning contributory negligence standards serve as the same arguments
for abandoning the pure form of joint and several liability.128 According to one
commentator, “The very basis of comparative negligence is that the relative fault of
individual actors can be determined and that each actor should be held responsible
for that degree of fault.”129 It is just as unfair for a plaintiff who is five percent at
fault to recover nothing as it is for a defendant who is five percent at fault to pay the
entire verdict, especially when the plaintiff’s liability is greater than that of the
defendant.130
At early common law, the doctrine of contributory negligence was a complete bar
to recovery when plaintiffs were found negligent for their own injuries, even if that
negligence was slight as compared to that of the defendants.131 Eventually, due to
the harshness of contributory negligence, courts have since moved to a comparative

126

See id.

127

“The contributory fault of a person does not bar the person as plaintiff from recovering
damages that have directly and proximately resulted from the tortious conduct of one or more
other persons, if the contributory fault of the plaintiff was not greater than the combined
tortious conduct of all other persons from whom the plaintiff seeks recovery in this action and
of all other persons from whom the plaintiff does not seek recovery in this action.” OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2315.33 (West Supp. 2003).
128
See John Scott Hickman, Efficiency, Fairness, and Common Sense: The Case for One
Action as to Percentage of Fault in Comparative Negligence Jurisdictions That Have
Abolished or Modified Joint and Several Liability, 48 VAND. L. REV. 739, 746 (1995).
129

Id.

130

Id.

131

Id. at 742.
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negligence standard.132 By 1995, forty-six states had adopted a comparative
negligence standard, which allows plaintiffs to recover damages against defendants
who are proportionately responsible, even when the plaintiff also contributes to the
loss.133 Following the adoption of comparative negligence by a small number of
courts, most state legislatures codified the doctrine during active tort reform
legislation in the 1980s.134 Many states enacted comparative fault systems but did
not clearly define how such systems would be integrated in determining damages.135
One of the issues that arose in adopting comparative fault was whether or not to
modify or abolish the doctrine of joint and several liability.136 By 1995, state
legislatures had stepped in, and thirty-four out of the forty-five comparative fault
states had used legislative action to amend their laws regarding joint and several
liability.137
There are various kinds of comparative fault, all of which allow a plaintiff who is
partially responsible to recover only damages that are appropriately reduced by the
plaintiff’s own negligence.138 Under a pure form of comparative fault,139 a plaintiff
can recover damages regardless of the percentage of the loss for which he or she is
found to be liable, including when his or her fault is found to be more than that of a
defendant or multiple defendants.140 There are two kinds of modified comparative
fault systems. One allows a plaintiff to recover damages only when that plaintiff’s
fault is less than that of the defendant(s).141 The other allows the plaintiff to recover
only when that plaintiff’s fault is not greater than that of the defendant(s).142 For
example, under the first, “less than,” version, a plaintiff can only collect from a
single defendant if that plaintiff is found to be forty-nine percent or less responsible.
Under the second “not greater than” version, a plaintiff can only collect if that
plaintiff is found to be fifty percent or less responsible for his own injuries. Ohio
applies the “not greater than” modified standard in which a plaintiff is barred from
recovery if the factfinder assigns the plaintiff a percentage of responsibility greater
132

Id.

133

Id.

134

Id.

135

Id.

136

Id.

137

Id. at 744. “[There is] [n]o legislature [that] has reversed a state supreme court decision
instituting comparative negligence. Rather, the legislatures have stepped in and codified the
principle in question, allowing for a more efficient and uniform implementation.” Id. at 743.
138

Cornelius J. Peck, Article: Washington’s Partial Rejection and Modification of the
Common Law Rule of Joint and Several Liability, 62 WASH. L. REV. 233, 237 (1987).
139

The “pure form” here is referring to a kind of comparative fault and is not to be
confused with a “pure form” of joint and several liability that is discussed throughout the
Note. They represent two separate and distinct concepts.
140

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT
note to cmt. n (Proposed Final Draft 1999).

OF

LIABILITY § 7 cmt. n and rptrs.

141

Id.

142

Id.
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than that of the defendant.143 For example, if an Ohio jury finds a plaintiff’s
negligence contributed fifty percent towards his or her own injury, that plaintiff can
still recover fifty percent of his or her damages from the tortfeasor(s). However, if a
plaintiff’s own negligence contributed fifty-one percent or greater, that plaintiff is
barred from recovery.
In Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply,144 a New Mexico court of appeals
determined that joint and several liability could not be retained in their state because
it applied a pure comparative negligence standard.145 Bartlett was an automobile
accident case involving three vehicles, one of which was being driven by an
unknown driver.146 Because one of the drivers was unknown, the plaintiff could only
sue the one known driver for her injuries.147 The jury found the known defendant to
be only thirty percent responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries and the unknown driver
to be seventy percent responsible.148 The plaintiff was awarded $100,000 for her
injuries.149 The court held that in its comparative negligence jurisdiction, a
concurrent tortfeasor will not be held liable for the entire verdict caused by other
tortfeasors.150
The plaintiff in Bartlett gave two reasons why joint and several liability should
be retained under a comparative negligence system, both of which the court
rejected.151 The first was that the jury should not be able to apportion damages
among separate defendants because there is only one wrong, causing one indivisible
injury.152 The court held that this “unity” concept is obsolete because it is based on
common law rules of pleading and joinder that no longer exist.153 The second reason
the plaintiff presented in arguing why joint and several liability should be retained
was that a plaintiff should not have to bear the risk of not being fully compensated.154
The court also rejected that argument and stated that, “Between one plaintiff and one
defendant, the plaintiff bears the risk of the defendant being insolvent; on what basis
does the risk shift if there are two defendants, and one is in solvent?”155 In other
143

The author is personally aware, having professional experience negotiating insurance
settlements, that this is the type of modified comparative negligence standard used in Ohio.
144

Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, 646 P.2d 579, 586 (N.M. Ct. App. 1892).

145

Id. The court found that as a concurrent tortfeasor, the defendant would not be held
liable based on joint and several liability.
146

Id. at 580.

147

Id.

148

Id.

149

Id.

150

Id. at 586. It was not disputed that the defendant and the unknown driver were
concurrent tortfeasors. Id. at 581.
151

Id. at 585.

152

Id.

153

Id.

154

Id.

155

Id.
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words, a solvent defendant should not necessarily have to bear the risk when there
happens to be an insolvent co-defendant. The court decided that joint and several
liability could not be retained solely on the premise that the plaintiff should be
favored over a defendant and, therefore, found the known defendant not responsible
for the entire verdict that was caused by two separate individuals.156
In Florida, the need for reform in apportionment law was also well illustrated in
Walt Disney World v. Wood.157 In Disney World, the plaintiff was injured while
driving a “race car” on a “Grand Prix” attraction when her fiancé rammed into the
rear of the vehicle that she was driving.158 The jury found the plaintiff fourteen
percent responsible, her fiancé eighty-five percent responsible and Disney only one
percent at fault.159 Because of the doctrine of spousal immunity, the plaintiff’s
husband160 was not required to pay any of the judgment. Disney was made to pay
eight-six percent of the verdict, approximately $75,000, after being found only one
percent responsible.161 Had Ohio’s modified form of joint and several liability been
applied in Disney World, Disney would have been made to pay one percent of
plaintiff’s damages,162 representing the percentage the jury held Disney responsible.
Because Disney’s percentage of liability did not meet the fifty percent threshold,
joint and several liability would not have be applied for economic or non-economic
damages.
Justice McDonald’s convincing dissent in Disney World avowed that the
doctrines of joint and several liability and comparative negligence are mutually
inconsistent.163 Due to this conflict, McDonald claimed that in a jurisdiction that
applies comparative negligence, joint and several liability should not apply because
each defendant should be held responsible for only the percentage of damages found
to have been caused by that defendant.164 He reasoned that comparative negligence
standards enable the court to separate damages in relation to the harm caused and
that the doctrine of joint and several liability “presumes the inability of the judiciary
to divide fault among the parties.”165 Thus, the two doctrines cannot appropriately be
applied together.
The majority in Disney World laid out the rationale for retaining joint and several
liability when a comparative fault standard is applied.166 One argument used was
156

Id. at 586.

157

See Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So.2d 198 (Fla. 1987).

158

Id. at 199.

159

Id.

160

By the time that the lawsuit was filed, the plaintiff had married her fiancé. Id.

161

Id.

162

The word “damages” refers to both economic and non-economic damages.

163

Id. at 202 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).

164

Id. (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).

165

Id. (McDonald, C.J., dissenting). Justice McDonald states that, “It would be a
mismatch of legal concepts to have a separation theory for the plaintiff and a joint liability
responsibility for the defendants.” Id. (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
166

Id. at 201.
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that a concurrent tortfeasor must still be held liable for a plaintiff’s whole injury
when his negligence is a proximate cause of that injury, regardless of the amount of
liability assessed to him.167 The court opined that merely apportioning fault among
the parties does not turn an indivisible injury into a “divisible” injury when applying
joint and several liability, because the negligence of one concurrent tortfeasor may
be enough to cause the entire loss.168 Justice McDonald confronted this reasoning by
stating that the old common law theory of a “united cause of action” causing an
indivisible injury, arose out of ancient pleading and joinder rules that no longer
present an apportionment dilemma.169 Therefore, the reasons which lie behind the
inability to apportion fault are no longer present because it is an “illogical fiction” to
say that fault can be apportioned under a pure comparative fault system, but
causation cannot.170
A second reason declared by the majority opinion in Disney World in support of
retaining joint and several liability was that a plaintiff should not be forced to bear a
portion of his or her damages when a defendant is unable to pay, especially when a
plaintiff has not contributed to his injury in any way.171 Justice McDonald strongly
disagreed and could not accept the injustice of shifting the risk to a solvent defendant
instead of the plaintiff, simply because there are two defendants.172 McDonald
quotes a Kansas Supreme Court decision, which states:
There is nothing inherently fair about a defendant who is 10% at fault
paying 100% of the loss, and there is no social policy that should compel
defendants to pay more than their fair share of the loss. Plaintiffs now
take the parties as they find them. If one of the parties at fault happens to
be a spouse or a governmental agency and if by reason of some competing
social policy the plaintiff cannot receive payment for his injuries from the
spouse or the agency, there is no compelling social policy which requires
the codefendant to pay more than his fair share of the loss. The same is
true if one of the defendants is wealthy and the other is not.173
McDonald also commented that joint and several liability applies to all
defendants, big and small.174 Because it affects large corporations, small businesses,
and individuals alike, the defendant is not always in the better position to spread the

167

Id.

168

Id.

169

Id. at 204 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).

170

Id. at 205 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).

171

Id. at 201.

172

Id. at 205. (McDonald, C.J., dissenting). McDonald could not accept any social policy
argument for Disney to have to pay one-hundred percent of the damage award just because the
plaintiff chose to marry the other tortfeasor, whom the jury found to be eighty-six percent
more at fault than Disney. Id. (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
173

Id. (McDonald, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (Kan.
1978)).
174

Id. (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
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cost of an insolvent codefendant.175 He declared that the plaintiff necessarily bears
the risk of a defendant not being able to pay, not a defendant.176
In the end, the Disney court could not say with certainty that joint and several
liability should be abolished when a comparative negligence standard is applied, and
held that in light of the public policy considerations surrounding the issues, this
decision would best be left up to the legislature.177 McDonald’s powerful dissent
however, demanded that when a plaintiff is found partially responsible for his own
injuries, joint and several liability should be abrogated.178 McDonald’s viewpoint is
in accord with the comparative fault doctrine in that each defendant should only be
held responsible for the amount that he or she is found liable.179 Therefore, the
arguments that McDonald uses in support of total abolition of joint and several
liability are equally valid in supporting the abrogation of joint and several liability
being applied to non-economic damages in Ohio’s modified form.
The concept behind joint and several liability is that there is a “unitary cause” of
action and no apportionment of liability among defendants is necessary.180 One of
the original goals in applying joint and several liability was to assure that, for at least
Therefore, Ohio’s
economic loss, the plaintiff would be made whole.181
apportionment requirement in negligence cases does not fit squarely with any form
of joint and several liability.182 “Joint and several liability, where comparative
assessments of fault have been made, contravenes the jury’s assessment of damages
by permitting a shifting of that assessment to the solvent party.”183 The Church court
agreed that comparative negligence principles and the doctrine of joint and several
liability cannot be applied together. It states:
The main principle of comparative negligence is that it is fair to divide
damages between the parties who are at fault based on each party’s degree
of fault. . . . The theory which underlies the comparative negligence
statute is the same theory upon with the statute abolishing joint and
several liability is based. It is not so much that the statutes are consistent
that is important, as it is the fact that abandonment of the concept of
indivisible injury paved the way for the abolition of joint and several
liability.184

175

Id. at 202 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).

176

Id. (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).

177

Id. at 202.

178

Id. at 206 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).

179

Id. at 202 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).

180

Werber, supra note 67, at 1069.

181

Id.

182

Id.

183

Id.

184

Church v. Rawson Drug & Sundry Co., No. 1 CA-CV 90-0357, 1992 Ariz. App. LEXIS
276, at *350 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 1992). One Ohio scholar also contends:
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Competing objectives of wanting defendants to be held liable only for their
proportionate share of total fault in which they contributed versus wanting injured
plaintiffs to be awarded full compensation at any cost has been the driving force
behind the controversy surrounding whether to retain joint and several liability in a
comparative negligence world.185 Because these “competing goals represent
conflicting values,”186 it is almost impossible to satisfy both objectives in any given
system.187 Abolishing joint and several liability, for both economic and noneconomic damages, appears to be the most consistent solution in adhering to the
purpose and goals that underlie a comparative fault system. However, situations will
arise in which a strong and appropriate arguments to retain joint and several liability
will surely surface.188 Ohio’s modified joint and several liability laws present a fair
and reasonable compromise to these competing interests and will withstand future
challenges.
B. Joint and Several Liability in a Growing Economy and “Sue Happy” Society
It is apparent to most observers that our society has, in recent years, become
increasingly litigious. A jurisdiction that applies joint and several liability,
especially in its pure form, creates a legal environment, which arguably encourages
litigants to file more frivolous lawsuits in hopes of establishing even a small
percentage of liability against a ‘deep pocket’ defendant. The cost of tort liability
has risen dramatically in the past three decades.189 The continuous increase in

Both doctrines serve valid objectives. Their merger, however, presents a serious
constitutional issue, which mandates the abolition of joint and several liability. There
is no recognition of this potential in any reported Ohio decision. Decisions which
have permitted joint and several liability to increase the payment made by a defendant,
without regard to the jury finding of that defendant’s actual contribution to the harm,
have generally focused on the need to protect victims and left the rights of
contribution to be fought among the defendants. Many courts have determined that
these doctrines are compatible and have upheld increased financial liability. Their
decisions err in three respects: They ignore history, their logic is wrong, and they fail
to recognize the magnitude of the harm done to the right to try by jury. This is a
situation in which the sum of two good parts yields a negative result serving largely to
impose an unfair burden on solvent defendants.
Werber, supra note 58, at 1189-90.
185

Hickman, supra note 128, at 744.

186

Id.

187

Id.

188

For example, when a severely injured plaintiff, who has not contributed to his or her
injury, is unable to collect non-economic damages because the more culpable defendant is
insolvent and the other defendants’ liability do not exceed the threshold necessary for joint and
several liability to kick in.
189
George N. Meros, Jr., Article: Toward a More Just and Predictable Civil Justice
System, 25 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 141, 143 (1998). This article noted a survey which showed that
“Florida’s small businesses—the economic engine of the state—are significantly intimidated
by the mere threat of liability . . . [and that] the concern is so acute that Florida businesses
would rather be subject to a tax audit or OSHA inspection than a liability suit.” Id. In
addition, the survey also showed that close to 200 Florida businesses indicated that “they have
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litigation costs, coupled with unpredictable outcomes of civil litigation, has become
increasingly detrimental to American commerce.190 For example, due to businesses’
fears of exposure to high cost litigation, manufacturers are more hesitant and allow
research and innovation to suffer in an attempt to assure the highest possible level of
product uniformity.191 In addition, products that serve a social good have either not
been under developed or withdrawn from the market.192 In turn, these effects have
“deterred commercial innovation, and stifled economic productivity.”193
The President and CEO of the Ohio Chamber of Commerce has commented on
the advantages of Ohio’s new joint and several liability laws and suggested that
under the old law the “business climate” in Ohio was adversely affected because of
an unpredictable and unfair civil justice system. 194 He referred to studies showing
that almost three out of every five small Ohio businesses had been involved in, or
threatened by, at least one lawsuit.195 He also reported that the combined cost of
frivolous lawsuit filings is somewhere between $1,200 and $1,500 per Ohioan, per
year, and a civil liability lawsuit is filed in Ohio once every seventeen minutes.196
One source proposed that lawsuit abuse in Ohio has an impact on the citizens of the
state and “threatens the state’s economic competitiveness.”197 Joint and several
liability negatively affects municipalities, but poses the same threat to private
individuals and not-for-profit companies alike.198
Returning to a pure form of joint and several liability would only perpetuate
abusive litigation practices by encouraging plaintiffs to file “shotgun” lawsuits aimed
at collecting full damages from any defendant with deep pockets, regardless of that

withheld, failed to develop, or refused to market products or services to limit exposure to
liability suits.” Id. at 144.
190
Id. at 143. The assistant general counsel to the U.S. Steel Corporation recently reported
that under Ohio’s previous pure form of joint and several liability, his company was defending
in excess of 2,500 claims that were subject to the “incredibly illogical and unfair doctrine [of
joint and several liability].” Regarding Apportionment of Liability in Civil Actions. Second
Hearing on SB 120 Before the House Civil & Commercial Law Committee (2002) (statement
of Richard Lerach, assistant general counsel, U.S. Steel Corporation), at
http://han2.hannah.com/htbin/f.com/oh_ban_124%3ASB120.notes (last visited February
2004).
191

Id.

192

Id.

193

Id.

194

Andy Doehrel, Testimony and Letters-Proponent Testimony on SB 120 Before the
House Civil & Commercial Law Committee (2002), at http://www.ohiochamber.com/
governmental/testimonySB120.asp (last visited October 2003).
195
General Facts, at http://www.omunileague.org/ohio_alliance_for_civil_justice.htm (last
visited October 2003).
196

Id.

197

Id.

198

THE ACADEMY
Olson ed., 1988.
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particular defendant’s degree of fault.199 This increase in lawsuit filings would
increase the cost of litigation for every citizen. Fostering this type of legal
environment would eventually backfire against Ohioans by chilling efforts to
continue commercial growth, especially for smaller businesses, which tend to be
most vulnerable.200 Ohio’s new joint and several liability laws require that plaintiff
attorneys conduct more thorough investigations in determining precisely who is
culpable.201 More thorough investigations should lower the number of lawsuits filed
for the sole purpose of nailing down at least one solvent defendant. These “off-thecuff” lawsuits exert only undue pressure on the defendant and his or her insurance
company to settle quickly in order to avoid being exposed to the entire verdict.202
The insurance industry is opposed to applying joint and several liability and has
been outspoken in its criticism.203 Industry leaders claim that the doctrine makes
insurance companies a “magnet for liability,” while at the same time, making it
extremely difficult for insurance companies to predict their degree of liability risk
exposure.204 Predicting the magnitude of a given policyholder’s “joint and several”
liability is very difficult for insurers because determining their exposure involves
having to factor in whether other parties to a lawsuit are going to be judgment proof
and whether that insurer is going to have pay for insolvent defendants.205 This makes
setting premium costs in a jurisdiction with joint and several liability much more
problematic. Thus, in applying Ohio’s laws, which partially do away with joint and
several liability, the scope of this unpredictable exposure is reduced and, therefore,
insurance carriers are able to set more appropriate premiums for consumers.

199

See Doehrel, supra note 194.

200

Id. One Ohio representative gave proponent testimony for Am. Sub. S.B. 120 and
stated,
[T]he civil justice system fosters a cancer in society. Namely, a litigation frenzy in
which no one wants to assume individual responsibility. . . .[T]he present [pure form]
law of joint and several liability defies all sense of fairness and promotes shotgun
lawsuits. SB120 will help small businesses, one-fourth of which are being sued or
threatened with a lawsuit at any given moment, often sued because they have
insurance.
Regarding Apportionment of Liability in Civil Actions. Second Hearing on SB 120 Before the
Senate Judiciary on Civil Justice (2001) (statement of Roger Geiger, state director of the
National Federation of Independent Business-Ohio), at http://han2.hannah.com/htbin/f.com/
oh_ban_124%3ASB120.notes (last visited February 2004).
201

Id.

202

Id.

203

THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, supra note 198, at 87.

204

Id. at 63.

205

Id. Various developments in “tort and insurance law” (including joint and several
liability) has added “unpredictability to the calculations insurers must make in setting liabilityinsurance premiums.” Id. “Since the aggregation of predictable risks is the essence of the
insurance function, it is extremely probable that the market’s instability during the crisis of
1985 and 1986—and a portion of the premium increases of that time—can be traced to [joint
and several liability and other tort reform developments].” Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Since the Ohio General Assembly has not evidenced any intent to fully abolish
joint and several liability, the modified form presents what this author feels to be a
fair compromise between competing interests. Just as abolishing joint and several
liability would leave some plaintiffs without full compensation, returning to the pure
form would be equally and arguably more unfair and burdensome to defendants
when they are made to pay a full verdict for which they were only marginally
responsible. Although some may argue that inadequacies still exist under the
modified form, there are actions that potential plaintiffs and defendants can take to
protect themselves from the vulnerabilities of the proportionate standard. For
example, individuals can purchase adequate uninsured motorist coverage, which
would ensure full compensation to plaintiffs injured in auto accidents where the
tortfeasor is uninsured or underinsured. Also, businesses and insurance companies
can take a more active approach in the area of risk analysis and underwriting
insurance policies to assure adequate coverage for defendants in situations where
joint and several liability is triggered for a plaintiff’s economic damages.206
In reviewing constitutional attacks to other tort reform measures, it is evident that
the modified form of joint and several liability is a fair and constitutionally sound
compromise. The new law allows plaintiffs to recover one hundred percent of their
economic loss from a culpable defendant who contributed to at least fifty one percent
of their injury, while shielding collectable defendants from having to “pick up the
tab” for other culpable defendants who are unable to pay their portion of noneconomic damages.
This proportionate standard is an appropriate resolution to the clash of competing
interests between the General Assembly’s objective of reforming Ohio’s tort laws
and the Plaintiff Bar’s efforts to maximize their client’s potential to collect a full
verdict. Thirty-four states have either abolished or modified joint and several
liability, and an additional four states have never adopted it.207 In upholding the
modified joint and several liability laws, Ohio lawmakers and judges are
demonstrating their belief in the need for and the importance of a fair and balanced
tort system.208
206

Shortly after the enactment of Am. Sub. S.B. 120, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003),
The Ohio Department of Insurance (ODI) issued guidelines to Ohio insurers regarding the
impact of Ohio’s new modified form of joint and several liability on future medical
malpractice premiums. Insurance Department Issues Med/Mal Guidelines, HANNAH NEWS
SERVICE, Apr. 25, 2003, available at http/www.ohcapcon.com/ipc/ipc.htm?/hanart/
20030425_HANNAH_4.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004). “ODI informed insurers that it
expects the provisions to be immediately incorporated into rate filings and supporting
documents. Compliance with the guidelines should help lower premiums for Ohio
physicians.” Id. The ODI is now requiring that all licensed insurers provide an overall rate
analyses and show how an overall rate change is consistent with that analysis and must explain
any expected changes in underwriting. Id. ODI concluded that modifying joint and several
liability in Ohio will have an impact on medical malpractice rates. Id.
207
Policy Facts-Tort Reform Joint and Several Liability 124th General Assembly,
http://www.ohiochamber.com/governmental/tortreform.asp (last visited October 2003).
208

According to one Ohio Senator, adopting the modified joint and several liability is “a
rational common-sense approach to balancing the scales of justice.”
Regarding
Apportionment of Liability in Civil Actions. First Hearing on SB 120 Before the Senate
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Judiciary on Civil Justice (2001) (statement of B. Johnson, Senator), at
http://han2.hannah.com/htbin/f.com/oh_ ban_124%3ASB120.notes (last visited February
2004).
209
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